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Local Politics and Chinese Indonesian Business  
in Post-Suharto Era
Wu-Ling Chong*
This article examines the relationships between the changes and continuities of 
Indonesian local politics and Chinese Indonesian business practices in the post-
Suharto era, focusing on Chinese Indonesian businesses in two of the largest Indo-
nesian cities, Medan and Surabaya.  The fall of Suharto in May 1998 led to the 
opening up of a democratic and liberal space as well as the removal of many dis-
criminatory measures against the Chinese minority.  However, due to the absence 
of an effective, genuinely reformist party or political coalition, predatory political-
business interests nurtured under Suharto’s New Order managed to capture the 
new political and economic regimes.  As a result, corruption and internal mis-
management continue to plague the bureaucracy in the country and devolve from 
the central to the local governments.  This article argues that this is due partially 
to the role some Chinese businesspeople have played in perpetuating corrupt busi-
ness practices.  As targets of extortion and corruption by bureaucratic officials and 
youth/crime organizations, Chinese businesspeople are not merely passive and 
powerless victims of corrupt practices.  This article argues, through a combination 
of Anthony Giddens’s structure-agency theory as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s notion 
of habitus and field, that although Chinese businesspeople are constrained by the 
muddy and corrupt business environment, they have also played an active role in 
shaping such a business environment.  They have thus played an active role in 
shaping local politics, which is infused with corruption and institutionalized gang-
sterism, as well as perpetuating their increasingly ambivalent position.
Keywords: Indonesia, Chinese Indonesians, Chinese Indonesian business,  
local politics, democratization, regional decentralization
Susanto, a Chinese Indonesian living in Medan, is a distributor of stuffed toys.  He runs 
his business from a shophouse located in the central city area.  He started his business 
in 2003, and the business has remained small-scale.  He brings in stuffed toys from Jakarta 
and sells them to customers in Medan.  He has 15 employees working for him, most of 
whom are indigenous Indonesians.
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Susanto revealed to me that after the end of the New Order regime, the central 
government has become stricter in collecting taxes from business enterprises.  Business 
owners need to declare their revenues, calculate the taxes they have to pay, and make 
payments accordingly.  Tax officers later visit the companies to check their actual rev-
enues.  If they find that the business owners have under-reported their revenue, instead 
of penalizing them, the tax officers usually ask for bribes to cover up the tax fraud. 
 Susanto emphasized, however, that even if a business owner has paid all the necessary 
taxes, tax officers usually create fictive taxes and charges and request the business owner 
to pay accordingly.  Moreover, tax officers often demand higher bribes from business-
people who are ethnic Chinese, as they are deemed to be doing better than other busi-
nesspeople.  For this reason, Susanto and many local Chinese businesspeople have found 
it expedient not to declare their actual revenues, knowing that honesty does not pay and 
will lead to even more taxes and bribes.  Instead, they wait for the officers to visit and 
negotiate with them the rates of the taxes and bribes requested and only then pay their 
taxes.  In my interview with him, Susanto said, “Although many other businesspeople 
and I feel bad about it, we have no choice but to pay them [the bribes] since we have to 
survive.”1)  Susanto also revealed that he and other Chinese businesspeople preferred 
not to fight against the extortion because they were “afraid of running into trouble” 
(Mandarin: pa mafan, 怕麻烦) if they did so.  They would rather pay the bribes to avoid 
any further problems.  This indicates also that Chinese businesspeople possess enough 
economic capital to pay the bribes in order to protect their business.
Susanto’s story indicates the ambivalence among Chinese toward democratization 
in post-Suharto Indonesia.  Although democratization has opened spaces for them to live 
their culture and express their ethnicity, it has not led to the emergence of good gover-
nance that promotes the rule of law, transparency, and accountability, as corruption 
remains endemic in state institutions.  This poorly developed democratization creates, 
therefore, an even more ambivalent situation for Chinese Indonesian businesspeople. 
On the one hand, they remain the targets of extortion and corruption by power holders; 
on the other hand, they play a role in perpetuating the corrupt, predatory political- 
business system.  It is also important to note that the local business environment in 
post-Suharto Indonesia is crucially influenced by local politics, especially after the imple-
mentation of regional decentralization in 2001.  If corrupt practices plague the local 
government, this will certainly lead to a corrupt and muddy business environment.  More-
over, if institutionalized gangsterism is dominant in a particular locality, the local business 
1) Interview with Susanto, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in the distribution of toys, 
Medan, August 4, 2010.
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community will encounter more harassment and extortion.
This study shows that Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in Medan encounter more 
harassment and extortion than their counterparts in Surabaya, because institutionalized 
gangsterism is dominant in Medan.  However, it is important to note that although Chi-
nese Indonesian businesspeople in Surabaya do not experience as much harassment and 
extortion, they still play a crucial role in perpetuating the corrupt local business environ-
ment.  In this article, I look at how local politics that is infused with corrupt practices and 
institutionalized gangsterism has led to the emergence of a corrupt and muddy business 
environment in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya.  I also examine how such a business 
environment has influenced the ways Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in both cities 
advance and safeguard their business interests as well as deal with illegal practices by 
government officials, police, and preman (thugs or gangsters).  I argue that in facing the 
corrupt and muddy business environment, due to the fear of the hassle of fighting back, 
as well as the economic and social capital they possess, Chinese Indonesian business-
people on the whole tend to give in to the illegal requests of government officials, police, 
and preman; they also resort to illegal or semi-legal means as well as opportunistic tactics 
to gain wealth and protect their business interests.  Although there are Chinese busi-
nesspeople who fight against the illegal practices, they are rare.  This collusion with 
corrupt practices in turn reinforces negative stereotypes against the Chinese and conse-
quently perpetuates their ambivalent position as well as corruption in local politics.
It is hoped that the case studies in this paper constitute a pioneering representation 
of Chinese Indonesian business communities in urban centers of post-Suharto Indone-
sia—primarily Medan and Surabaya, because both are big cities with a relatively high 
percentage of ethnic Chinese Indonesians.  The dynamics of Chinese Indonesian business 
communities in post-Suharto urban Indonesia are therefore apparent in this study.
This article is divided into 10 main sections.  The first section deals with theoretical 
issues.  The second focuses on research methodology.  The third section looks at the 
economic role of ethnic Chinese in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya.  Next, I turn my 
attention to local governance and the business environment in post-Suharto Indonesia 
as well as the experiences of Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in Medan and Surabaya. 
I point out that Chinese big business as well as Chinese small and medium businesses 
deal with the new business environment in different ways.  Then I discuss the changes 
in the political environment and the political activism of Chinese Indonesian business-
people in the post-Suharto era.  In the remaining four sections, I examine the illegal and 
semi-legal business practices utilized by Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in both 
cities to safeguard their business interests.  I conclude that there is evidence to suggest 
that Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in Medan and Surabaya continue to encounter 
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rampant corrupt practices in bureaucracy as well as harassment and extortion from local 
power holders and youth/crime organizations (in Medan) since the end of the New Order. 
Using Anthony Giddens’s concept of structure and agency, and Pierre Bourdieu’s notion 
of habitus and field, I argue that such a corrupt, predatory political-business system 
continues to exist not only because the predatory political-business interests nurtured 
under the New Order managed to capture the new political vehicles and institutions, but 
also because many, if not most, local Chinese businesspeople play a role in perpetuating 
the system.
Theoretical Framework
This study adopts a combination of Anthony Giddens’s structure-agency theory as well 
as Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and field as a framework for examining strategies 
and tactics that Chinese Indonesians adopt to safeguard their business interests in the 
post-Suharto era.  Both Giddens and Bourdieu perceive social actors as agents that 
actively respond to and shape their social structures.  Giddens argues that our social 
reality is shaped by both social forces and active human agency.  All people are knowl-
edgeable about the conditions and consequences of their actions in their daily lives. 
Although people are not entirely free to choose their own actions, they do have agency 
(Giddens 1984).  Therefore, Giddens sees social structures as both the medium and the 
outcome of the actors’ actions:
As human beings, we do make choices, and we do not simply respond passively to events around 
us.  The way forward in bridging the gap between “structural” and “action” approaches is to rec-
ognize that we actively make and remake social structure during the course of our everyday activ-
ities. (Giddens 1989, 705, emphasis in the original)
Habitus, according to Bourdieu, is a system of acquired dispositions through which 
people deal with the social world (Bourdieu 1990a, 131).  Bourdieu also notes that “[a]s 
an acquired system of generative schemes, the habitus makes possible the free produc-
tion of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the condition of production” 
(Bourdieu 1990b, 55).  In other words, habitus is an orientation to individual action.  The 
concept of field complements the idea of habitus.  A field is a relatively autonomous arena 
within which people act strategically, depending on their habitus, to enhance their capital. 
Examples of fields include politics, religion, and philosophy (Bourdieu 1993, 72–74). 
Bourdieu considers habitus to be the union of structures and agency: “. . . habitus oper-
ates as a structuring structure able to selectively perceive and to transform the objective 
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structure [field] according to its own structure while, at the same time, being re- 
structured, transformed in its makeup by the pressure of the objective structure” 
 (Bourdieu 2005, 46–47).  In other words, habitus shapes the objective structure (field) 
but at the same time is also shaped by the objective structure.  This concept is parallel 
to Giddens’s structure-agency theory.  One of the significant strengths of Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus lies in its consideration of actors’ social positions in the study of habitus; 
this is never discussed in Giddens’s theory.  Bourdieu argues that a person’s habitus is 
structured by his or her position within a social space, which is determined by his or her 
sociological characteristics in the form of volume and kinds of economic capital, cultural 
capital, and social capital possessed (Bourdieu 1984, 114; 1998, 6–8).  Economic capital 
refers to material resources that can be turned into money or property rights.  Cultural 
capital refers to non-material goods such as types of knowledge, skills and expertise, 
educational credentials, and aesthetic preferences acquired through upbringing and edu-
cation that can be converted into economic capital.  Social capital refers to networks of 
contacts that can be used to maintain or advance one’s social position (Bourdieu 1986).
According to Bourdieu, actors who are well endowed with capital and therefore enjoy 
privileged positions in a particular field tend to defend the status quo in order to safeguard 
their capital, whereas those least endowed with capital and therefore occupying the 
less-advantaged positions within the field are inclined to challenge the status quo via 
subversion strategies in order to enhance their capital and improve their social positions 
 (Bourdieu 1993, 73).
Hence, this is the theoretical framework for this study: Social structures constrain 
and enable actors’ actions.  Actors’ actions are always oriented by their habitus, which is 
dependent on the volume and kinds of capital possessed.  Those who are well endowed 
with capital in a social structure tend to defend the status quo of the structure in order 
to safeguard their capital and position, whereas those least endowed with capital within 
the structure are inclined to challenge it via subversion strategies.
Methods of Research
My analysis is based on fieldwork conducted from July 2010 until May 2011 in Medan 
and Surabaya.2)  Medan and Surabaya were selected as field sites for this study since both 
cities are economically and politically significant.  These cities are the capitals of North 
Sumatra and East Java respectively, which have been “the sites of vibrant urban and 
2) I also had a personal communication with an academic in Jakarta.
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industrial centers” (Hadiz 2004, 623).  Medan is a historically important town for planta-
tions, manufacturing, and trade, while Surabaya is a vital port city that functions as a 
gateway to Eastern Indonesia (Buiskool 2004, 1; Hadiz 2004, 623).  According to City 
Population, an online atlas, Medan and Surabaya were the fifth- and second-largest cities 
in the country respectively in 2010 (City Population 2012).  Both cities also have a sig-
nificant Chinese Indonesian population: according to the Indonesian Population Census 
of 2000, the concentration of the Chinese Indonesian population was 10.65 percent in 
Medan and 4.37 percent in Surabaya,3) figures that are much higher than the percentage 
of Chinese Indonesians in the total population of Indonesia (1.2 percent) (Aris et al. 2008, 
27, Table 2.2).  The methods used in this research are library research and individual 
interviews.  I conducted library research at public as well as university libraries.  I also 
interviewed or had personal communications with 12 Chinese Indonesian businesspeople, 
three politicians, one journalist, eight NGOs or social activists, one leader of the North 
Sumatra branch of Pancasila Youth (PP, Pemuda Pancasila), seven staff or people in 
charge of local Chinese-language presses, six academics or university lecturers, and one 
former staff of a real estate company in Surabaya’s Chinatown (see Appendix).  All inter-
views and personal communications were conducted in Indonesian, Mandarin, Hokkien, 
or English.  All names of informants used in this article, except for public figures, are 
pseudonyms.
The Economic Role of Ethnic Chinese in Post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya
Sofyan Wanandi (1999), Michael Backman (2001), and Charles A. Coppel (2008) have 
pointed out that it is commonly asserted that ethnic Chinese control 70 percent of 
Indonesia’s economy, although official data on the economic domination of Chinese in 
Indonesia is unavailable.  These authors emphasize that such a view is an exaggeration 
because a large portion of Indonesia’s economy (such as the oil and gas industry) has 
always been under the control of the state, not the Chinese (Wanandi 1999; Backman 
2001; Coppel 2008).  In addition, the sociologist Mely G. Tan (陈玉兰) argues that it is 
impossible for the Chinese minority, who constitute less than 3 percent of the total 
population in Indonesia, to control 70 percent of the national economy.4)  Wanandi sug-
gests that Chinese Indonesian businesses constitute only 25 percent of the national 
3) Calculated from Central Statistics Agency of North Sumatra (2001, 40, Table 6) and Central Statis-
tics Agency of East Java (2001, 75, Table 10.9).  These are the latest official figures on the Chinese 
Indonesian populations in Medan and Surabaya.
4) Personal communication with Mely G. Tan, sociologist, Jakarta, June 8, 2010.
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economy, while Backman estimates that Chinese Indonesians “control 70 percent of the 
private, corporate, domestic capital” (Wanandi 1999, 132; Backman 2001, 88).
In the post-Suharto era, Chinese Indonesians continue to play a crucial role in the 
economic development of Medan and Surabaya.  Since there is no official data available 
specifically on the economic domination of Chinese Indonesians, I had to rely on indi-
vidual interviews to obtain information on this aspect.  According to an NGO activist in 
Medan, Chinese Indonesians in the city dominate businesses that are medium-sized and 
larger, such as manufacturing, food production, and hotels.  At the same time, domination 
of businesses that are medium-sized and smaller is split almost evenly between Chinese 
and indigenous businesspeople.  Businesses that are small and micro are dominated by 
indigenous businesspeople.5)  In addition, three other NGO activists disclosed that Chi-
nese businesspeople engage in nearly all sectors of the economy in Medan except the 
construction industry, which is dominated by indigenous businesspeople who are Batak 
and members of youth/crime organizations.6)  This is because most construction projects 
in Medan are local state projects that are usually allocated to members of youth/crime 
organizations who are well connected to the local government.7)  A local economic analyst 
in Surabaya remarked that Chinese businesspeople dominate 100 percent of the manu-
facturing business and about 90 percent of the real estate business in the city.  In addition, 
more than 60 percent of bankers and about 70 percent of advertisers in Surabaya are 
Chinese Indonesians.8)  In short, based on the information provided by my informants, 
Chinese Indonesians continue to dominate the private economy of Medan and Surabaya 
in the post-New Order era.
Local Governance and Business Environment in Post-Suharto Indonesia
In order to accommodate growing regional and local demands for greater autonomy in 
access to local resources and control of local political machines, the post-Suharto govern-
ment introduced regional decentralization and local autonomy policies under two umbrella 
laws, Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999.  These laws were later revised and replaced 
with Law No. 32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004.  Under the decentralization laws and regula-
5) Interview with Halim, NGO activist, Medan, July 26, 2010.
6) Interview with Daniel (deceased), former media activist, Medan, September 17, 2010; interview 
with Surya, media activist, Medan, September 17, 2010; interview with Halim, July 26, 2010.
7) Interview with Halim, July 26, 2010.  This point is elaborated in the section titled “Relations with 
Preman.”
8) Interview with Wahyu, economic analyst and university lecturer, Surabaya, May 18, 2011.
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tions, significant administrative powers in industry, trade, investments, agriculture, pub-
lic works, transport, cooperatives, labor, land, health care, education and culture, and 
environmental issues transferred from the central government to regional and local 
govern ments (Ariel and Hadiz 2005, 261; Hadiz and Robison 2005, 233; Widjajanti 2009, 
76).  According to the scholar-bureaucrat Ryaas Rasyid, who was appointed by President 
 Habibie to form a group known as the Team of Ten (Tim Sepuluh) to formulate the 
decentralization laws and regulations, “The [decentralization] policy was intended to 
provide more scope for local creativity and initiative in making policy and promoting 
public participation” (Rasyid 2003, 64).  Therefore, it can be said that in the context of 
Indonesia, one of the objectives of regional decentralization is to promote democratization 
at the local level.
Moreover, international and domestic organizations such as the SMERU Research 
Institute, the World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) have been actively offering policy advice on decentralization of state authority 
in the country.  The SMERU Research Institute sees regional decentralization as a huge 
administrative operation that could improve weaknesses in the administration of central 
and local governments (Syaikhu 2002).  The World Bank believes that decentralization 
will break up stifling central government authority, reduce complex bureaucratic proce-
dures and administrative bottlenecks, as well as “increase government officials’ sensitiv-
ity to local conditions and needs” (World Bank Group, n.d.).  A USAID publication argues 
that decentralization will stimulate the development of democratic, accountable, and 
effective local governance (USAID Office of Democracy and Governance 2000, 7).  In 
particular, the Asia Foundation assists local governments in addressing inefficiencies in 
the business licensing process and reducing the cost of doing business in Indonesia 
through developing the One Stop Shops (OSS) program.  OSS are service centers that 
handle applications for various business permits (Steer 2006).  As stated in an article that 
introduces the program, “[OSS] are new institutions that merge authority from disparate 
technical departments into one office where licenses and permits can be obtained quickly” 
(ibid., 7).
However, according to some scholars, the end of authoritarianism and the subse-
quent opening up of politics, as well as the introduction of regional decentralization, have 
not led to the emergence of good governance that is able to deploy public authority and 
public resources in a regularized manner for public purposes.  Both Marcus Mietzner and 
Jamie S. Davidson point out that corruption and internal mismanagement continue to 
characterize the bureaucracy in the country (Mietzner 2008, 244–248; Davidson 2009, 
294).  Due to the absence of an effective, genuinely reformist party or political coalition, 
the demise of Suharto’s New Order regime did not end the rampant corruption and 
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internal mismanagement in the country’s bureaucracy.  According to Vedi R. Hadiz and 
Richard Robison, the predatory political-business interests nurtured under the New 
Order managed to reconstitute and reorganize themselves successfully within the new 
political and economic regimes.  Newly decentralized and competing predatory interests 
contest to gain ascendancy at the local level of politics as regional decentralization has 
created new rent-seeking opportunities for local governments (Hadiz and Robison 2005, 
232).  In other words, corruption, or what Indonesians generally call KKN (the Indonesian- 
language acronym for corruption, collusion, and nepotism), has devolved from the central 
to local governments.
For instance, during my fieldwork in Medan, the OSS program, which was estab-
lished with the aim of addressing the licensing process and reducing the burden on busi-
ness, actually created more burdens for local businesspeople.  According to a news report 
in Harian Orbit, a local Indonesian-language newspaper in Medan, officials at the center 
often demand bribes by asking for “service charges” from applicants.  If the applicants 
refuse to pay, they need to wait a long time before getting their permits (Harian Orbit, 
November 15, 2010).  For instance, applicants for a business permit (SIUP, Surat Izin 
Usaha Perdagangan) need to pay an extra Rp.150,000 of unofficial “service charge” to 
the officials in order to get a permit on time (ibid.).  Such incidents have been highlighted 
in the press, and the then Medan Mayor Rahudman Harahap said he would summon the 
persons in charge of the OSS (Harian Orbit, November 16, 2010).  But as of December 
2013, the local government had not yet investigated the problem and such corrupt prac-
tices were still rampant in the OSS of Medan (Batak Pos, December 5, 2013).
Although Joko Widodo, a politician who does not have any ties to the New Order 
regime, was elected as the new president of Indonesia in 2014 and promised to improve 
and simplify business licensing procedures in government offices, the House of Repre-
sentatives is dominated by parliamentarians who favor Prabowo Subianto, Widodo’s only 
opponent in the presidential election (The Jakarta Globe, October 9, 2014; October 28, 
2014).  Subianto is a former general who used to be Suharto’s son-in-law.9)  He was 
accused of human rights violations when he was a general (Tomsa 2009).  Subianto’s sup-
porters in the House of Representatives declared that they would block every policy 
made by Widodo.  Hence, it might not be easy for Widodo to deliver on his promise to 
address the licensing process and reduce the burden on business.
In addition, scholars have noted that the implementation of regional decentralization 
in Indonesia has produced many regional heads who behave like “little kings” (raja-raja 
kecil) in the sense that they perceive decentralization and autonomy as meaning more 
9) Subianto and his wife (Suharto’s daughter) were divorced after the end of the Suharto regime.
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power given to them to control local resources and raise revenues rather than as greater 
responsibility for them to offer better public services to their local constituencies.  These 
“little kings” are unaccountable to central authorities, local parliaments, or local citizens 
(Azis 2003, 3; Hofman and Kaiser 2004, 26; 2006, 97; Firman 2009, 148).  Since the 
decentralization law went into effect, local governments in Indonesia have had more 
power to tax the local population in order to raise revenues.  According to my informants, 
the imposition of new taxes has increased the burden on local businesspeople, particularly 
those running small or medium businesses.10)  The local governments in Medan and 
Surabaya have been levying new taxes and charges on businesses as a means to increase 
direct revenues, as well as to extract indirect revenues in the form of bribes.  Moreover, 
officials at all levels of government—central, provincial, and local—claim ultimate author-
ity over many kinds of investment activity (Hadiz and Robison 2005, 235–236).  This 
increases unpredictability in business, as well as the necessity to further the common 
practice of bribing officials for licenses and the like.
At the end of 2010, the Committee of Monitoring for Regional Autonomy (KPPOD, 
Komite Pemantau Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah), an NGO in Indonesia that monitors 
the implementation of regional autonomy in the country, announced that North Sumatra 
and East Java, where Medan and Surabaya are located, had more problematic local regu-
lations issued by the city and kabupaten governments than all the other provinces.  The 
committee proposed that 315 local regulations in North Sumatra and 291 local regulations 
in East Java should be abolished because they were deemed to hamper business activities 
in the provinces.  Nevertheless, as of 2011, the city and kabupaten governments of North 
Sumatra and East Java had only repealed 98 and 91 of the problematic regulations respec-
tively (Jawa Pos National Network, February 23, 2011).11)
Therefore, it can be said that local politics in North Sumatra and East Java is infused 
with corruption.  However, it is also important to note that there is a significant difference 
between the two provinces in regard to local politics: the dominance of institutionalized 
gangsterism in North Sumatra.  In other words, youth/crime organizations are influential 
and dominant in North Sumatra.  According to Vedi R. Hadiz (2010), such organizations 
exist also in Surabaya but are much less dominant.  As the capital of North Sumatra, 
Medan is notorious for its institutionalized gangsterism or premanism and is therefore 
known as a gangster city (kota preman) (Honna 2011).  The origins of preman go back to 
10) Interview with Johan Tjongiran, social activist, Medan, August 3, 2010; interview with Sofyan Tan, 
a candidate in Medan’s 2010 mayoral election and social activist, Medan, August 23, 2010; interview 
with Harianto, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in the beverage production industry, 
Surabaya, November 23, 2010.
11) These are the latest data available.  There is no further update after 2011.
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the 1945–49 Indonesian National Revolution and the late 1950s.  According to Ian Wilson, 
during the revolution strongmen and toughs were at the forefront of the struggle for 
Indonesia’s independence.  Many of them were later incorporated into the new national 
military (Wilson 2010, 201).  In 1954 General Nasution, the head of the armed forces, 
“deployed networks of gangsters and former militias as part of a campaign to pressure 
Sukarno into suspending parliamentary democracy, eventually ushering in the period 
known as ‘Guided Democracy’” (ibid.).12)  Pancasila Youth (PP, Pemuda Pancasila), the 
largest quasi-official youth/crime organization, was formed out of this alliance.  In the 
mid-1960s, the military mobilized PP and local gangsters to confront and crush suspected 
members of the Communist Party (Ryter 2000, 19; 2001; 2002; Hadiz 2004, 626).  Former 
Governor of North Sumatra Syamsul Arifin, interviewed in The Act of Killing—a 2012 
documentary film about the anti-communist genocide—acknowledged the important role 
of gangsters in eliminating communism in Indonesia: “Communism will never be accepted 
here, because we have so many gangsters, and that’s a good thing” (cited in the subtitles 
of Oppenheimer 2012).  Under Suharto the institutionalization of local gangsters was 
further intensified (Wilson 2011, 242).  Apart from PP, other quasi-official youth/crime 
organizations, such as the Army Veterans’ Youth (PPM, Pemuda Panca Marga) and 
Armed Forces Sons’ and Daughters’ Communication Forum (FKPPI, Forum Komunikasi 
Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia), were formed to help maintain political order and 
stability through violence and intimidation (Ryter 2001; 2005, 22; Beittinger-Lee 2009, 
164).  These organizations are generally considered to be “fronts for preman activity” 
(Hadiz 2003, 125–126) and were usually backed and protected by the military during the 
New Order period (Ryter 2000, 20).  Thus, such organizations are also known as “preman 
organizations” (Wilson 2010, 200).  (Hereafter, the terms “youth/crime organizations” 
and “preman organizations” will be used interchangeably.) Therefore, it can be said that 
the distinction between preman, soldier, politician, and criminal is often blurry.
After the unraveling of the New Order regime, despite losing their main backer, 
preman have been able to survive by taking advantage of the inability of the post-New 
Order regimes to maintain security and the opportunities opened up by competitive 
electoral politics as well as regional decentralization.  Many political parties have estab-
lished their own paramilitary wings or civilian militia known as satgas parpol (satuan tugas 
partai politik, i.e., political party militias).  Members come mostly from youth/crime 
organizations such as PP and “[mercenaries] of the disenfranchised urban milieu” (King 
2003).  Moreover, preman still dominate the protection racket scene in Indonesia.
As ethnic Chinese are often deemed wealthier than other residents in Medan, they 
12) For the background and characteristics of Guided Democracy, see Ricklefs (2008, 292–321).
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become the target of extortion for preman (Hadiluwih 1994, 159).  It is also common for 
local Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in the city to rely on extralegal resources 
such as preman for their security and protection (Purdey 2006, 117).  Preman in Medan 
are mostly members of major New Order-nurtured youth/crime organizations such as 
PP, Work Service Youth Association (IPK, Ikatan Pemuda Karya), and FKPPI.  When 
the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia- 
Perjuangan) became the ruling party after winning a majority of national parliamentary 
seats in the 1999 elections, they formed Satgas PDI-P as the paramilitary arm of the 
party to compete with the other more established youth/crime organizations in Medan 
in controlling local state and private resources (Hadiz 2003, 128).13)  Although satgas 
were banned in 2004, they later revived in a less formal way (Wilson 2010, 204–205).  In 
other words, there are more preman organizations in Medan now than before the fall of 
Suharto.
Indeed, according to Hadiz, the collapse of the Suharto regime did not reduce the 
influence of local preman linked to youth/crime organizations in Medan, but instead 
brought new opportunities for them to exploit (Hadiz 2004, 626).  These preman are able 
to provide muscle for candidates during election periods and fund political bids since they 
dominate lucrative underworld businesses (Hadiz 2003, 128).  In addition, many leaders 
of youth/crime organizations are given opportunities to run local branches of political 
parties.  Some even hold local parliamentary seats and top executive body positions in 
local government (ibid., 125–126).  For instance, during 1999–2004, three members of 
the Medan city parliament—Bangkit Sitepu (Golkar), Moses Tambunan (Golkar), and 
Martius Latuperissa (Justice and Unity Party)—were leaders of the local branches of 
preman organizations.  Sitepu, Tambunan, and Latuperissa led the Medan branches of 
PP, IPK, and FKPPI respectively (Ryter 2000, 19–21; Bambang 2002; Hadiz 2005, 47). 
Besides that, Ajib Shah, the former chairperson of PP’s North Sumatra branch, is a 
member of the North Sumatra provincial parliament who was affiliated to Golkar during 
2009–14 (Harian Mandiri, May 11, 2012; Harian Sumut Pos, April 23, 2013; Medan 
Bisnis, August 29, 2013).  He was also one of the candidates in Medan’s 2010 mayoral 
election (Pancasila Youth of North Sumatra’s website, 2010).  Therefore, it can be said 
that members and leaders of local youth/crime organizations in Medan have captured the 
new local state institutions and political vehicles in the Reformasi era.
This is felt by some of my informants who are local Chinese businesspeople in 
13) Among all political parties, PDI-P has the largest number of members with a preman background. 
The party greatly appealed to preman through its populist approach and pro-“little people” rhetoric 
(see Wilson 2010, 204).
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Medan, who say they have encountered more harassment and extortion from preman in 
the post-Suharto era, especially during Megawati’s presidency (2001–04).14)  A few of my 
informants disclosed that preman often ask for “protection money” from businesspeople 
who own factories or shophouses, and if the latter do not pay up the preman vandalize 
these places.15)  To further squeeze money from these businesses, when an owner or 
their employees load or unload goods in front of their shophouse, preman again force 
their loading or unloading services on the business.  Usually they charge Rp.500–1,000 
per item of goods.  Even if the business owner or their employees refuse such service, 
they still need to pay the preman, who will otherwise vandalize their shophouses.16)  In 
addition, preman ask for Rp.300,000–500,000 when a businessperson opens a new com-
pany in their area; and if a shophouse is renovated, the owner also needs to pay a certain 
amount of money to preman.17)  Moreover, whenever preman organizations have instal-
lation events, they send an “invitation” with a proposal for expenses to be paid by busi-
nesspeople and ask for “donations.”  Normally, businesspeople need to pay them at least 
Rp.10,000–20,000.18)  Some Chinese businesspeople need to pay uang keamanan (protec-
tion money) to more than one preman if there is more than one youth/crime organization 
that claims authority over that particular area.19)  As a “service” to industrialists, preman 
also help to break up strikes.20)
It is important to point out that preman demand uang keamanan also from indigenous 
businesspeople.21)  But my informants disclosed that they often ask for more uang 
keamanan from businesspeople who are ethnic Chinese as the latter are deemed to be 
doing better in business than their non-Chinese counterparts.22)
14) Interview with Susanto, August 4, 2010; interview with Eddie, an ethnic Chinese businessperson 
engaged in the distribution of mechanical power-transmission products, Medan, November 10, 2010.
15) Interview with Hasyim a.k.a. Oei Kien Lim, member of Medan city parliament, 2009–present, 
Medan, August 11, 2010; interview with Sofyan Tan, August 23, 2010; interview with Halim, July 
26, 2010; interview with Joko, NGO activist, Medan, November 11, 2010.
16) Interview with Johan Tjongiran, August 3, 2010; interview with Andi, journalist, Medan, September 
20, 2010.
17) Interview with Johan Tjongiran, August 3, 2010.
18) Interview with Daniel (deceased), September 17, 2010; interview with Johan Tjongiran, August 3, 
2010.
19) Interview with Andi, September 20, 2010.
20) Interview with Halim, July 26, 2010.
21) For instance, an indigenous businesswoman who owned a restaurant in Medan was beaten by two 
preman on November 4, 2010, as she refused to pay the Rp.500,000 “protection money,” which she 
deemed too high (see Harian Orbit, November 12, 2010).  In addition, preman often extort money 
from small and medium businesspeople, including street vendors (pedagang kaki lima), who are 
mostly indigenous Indonesians, in exchange for “protection” (see Tan 2004, 134-136).
22) Interview with Susanto, August 4, 2010; interview with Sofyan Tan, August 23, 2010.
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Why do preman ask for money from the business community?  According to the 
chief of PP’s North Sumatra branch, there are too many unemployed citizens in Indone-
sia.  If they join “youth” organizations such as PP, the organizations arrange for them to 
help in taking care of the safety of business areas and let them collect money from the 
businesspeople.23)  The sociologist Usman Pelly and criminologist Mohammad Irvan Olii, 
as interviewed by Gatra and The Jakarta Globe respectively, made a similar argument 
that poverty and unemployment are the main causes of premanism (Sujatmoko et al. 1995, 
27; The Jakarta Globe, February 24, 2012).  According to another source, the unemploy-
ment rate in Indonesia reached 6.8 percent in 2011, and more than half the population 
were living on less than US$2 per day in the same year.  In addition, more than 65 per-
cent of workers in the country were employed informally (Brooks 2011).24)  Poverty 
and the failure of the Indonesian government to create sufficient employment oppor-
tunities for its citizens are seen by many as the main causes of the rampancy of such 
extortion.
Informants told me that preman have become less active since President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14) came to power because the police have become more 
powerful and have started to arrest preman who extort money from the business com-
munity.25)  This corresponds to findings by other scholars working on Indonesia (Aspinall 
et al. 2011, 33; Wilson 2011, 257–258).  According to Wilson, high-profile anti-preman 
campaigns were initially run by the police in 2001 and were limited only to Jakarta, but 
they became national in scope by 2004 (Wilson 2011, 257).  Aspinall and his co-authors, 
on the other hand, remarked that the influence of IPK, which was once a dominant youth/
crime organization in Medan, has declined since the death of its founder, Olo Panggabean, 
in 2009 (Aspinall et al. 2011, 33).26)  The diminution of IPK’s power is due also to a police 
crackdown on illegal gambling run by the organization.  Although the power of preman 
organizations in the city has declined markedly, it is alleged that business enterprises in 
certain areas such as Jalan Asia and Jalan Gatot Subroto still encounter harassment and 
extortion from preman.27)
In Surabaya, on the other hand, youth/crime organizations such as PP and FKPPI 
are much less dominant and influential.  In addition, IPK, which is based in North  Sumatra, 
does not have a presence in East Java.  Preman who offer “protection” for Chinese busi-
23) Interview with Anuar Shah, chairperson, PP’s North Sumatra branch, Medan, October 30, 2010.
24) These are the latest data available at the time of writing.
25) Interview with Johan Tjongiran, August 3, 2010; interview with Susanto, August 4, 2010; interview 
with Dirk A. Buiskool, historian, Medan, July 14, 2010.
26) See also Harian Global (April 30, 2009).
27) Interview with Andi, September 20, 2010.
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ness premises in Surabaya are often unorganized Madurese preman.  According to Dédé 
Oetomo (温忠孝), an ethnic Chinese social activist in Surabaya, there is a system of 
mutual dependence between Chinese businesspeople and Madurese preman in  Surabaya. 
Chinese businesspeople usually pay about Rp.500,000 a month to the Madurese preman 
in exchange for protection of their business.28)  The preman make sure that the business 
premises in their territories are free of burglary, theft, robbery, and vandalism.29)  Such 
a system of mutual dependence existed in the city even before the demise of the New 
Order regime.  Although unorganized, Madurese preman normally allocate their territo-
ries among themselves so that each area has only one preman in charge of its “safety.” 
Since in general Chinese businesspeople in Surabaya need to pay only one preman in 
exchange for protection of their business premises, it can be said that they enjoy a rela-
tively peaceful business environment compared to their counterparts in Medan who need 
to deal with more preman organizations in the post-Suharto era, and pay more than one 
preman if there is more than one youth/crime organization that claims authority over that 
particular area.
In addition, according to Jun Honna (2010, 148) and Hadiz (2010, 156), industrialists 
in Surabaya often hire Madurese preman or members of Banser, the vigilante corps of 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest mass-based Muslim organization in Indonesia, to break 
up strikes.  NU has a strong base in East Java.
In Surabaya, military and police units are more dominant than youth/crime organiza-
tions and Banser in the control of underworld activities.  According to Hadiz, it is alleged 
that the military act as immediate protectors and bodyguards for illegal gambling opera-
tions controlled by Chinese Indonesians in Surabaya.  Furthermore, navy and marine 
units in the city are said to have direct links with local prostitution (ibid., 140).30)
It is ironic, therefore, that in attempting to control preman activities, the police have 
started acting like preman.  According to an NGO activist in Medan, local police officers 
often extort money from businesspeople in the city, especially those who own factories; 
such incidents have become more rampant, especially throughout the anti-preman cam-
paigns.31)  Police officers pay a visit to the factory and ask for money.  If the business 
owner refuses to pay, the police coerce him or her to admit to offenses that he or she did 
28) Interview with Dédé Oetomo, social activist, Surabaya, December 24, 2010.
29) Interview with Dédé Oetomo, social activist, Surabaya, December 24, 2010.
30) Ironically, in May 1998, when riots against the Chinese broke out in several major cities in Indone-
sia, it was reported that the local Chinese Indonesian business community in Surabaya was able to 
guarantee relative peace in the city by paying generously for local military protection, in contrast 
to many other cities such as Medan, Jakarta and Solo, where all troops mysteriously disappeared 
when the riots broke out (Dick 2003, 475; Purdey 2006, 113–122).
31) Interview with Joko, November 11, 2010.
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not commit and threaten to close down the factory.  Sometimes the police even confiscate 
machines in a factory if the business owner refuses to pay them.32)  Wilson suggests that 
such phenomena indicate that some police “have used the campaigns as an opportunity 
to reclaim sources of illegal rent extraction taken from them by street level racketeers” 
(Wilson 2011, 257).  A well-established Chinese businessperson in Medan even remarked 
that:
During Suharto’s reign, the military was the most powerful institution.  Since the fall of Suharto, 
the military is not as powerful as before.  Now the police are more powerful.  They often ask for 
money from businesspeople and will give us a hard time if we refuse to pay them.  So the police 
are no different from a select group of scoundrels.33)
Similarly, in Surabaya, the police often ask for money from local businesspeople, 
who are mostly ethnic Chinese.  According to an informant who used to work in a real 
estate company in Surabaya’s Chinatown, whenever the police have an event they ask 
for contributions from businesspeople in their area.  If the businesspeople refuse to pay, 
the police give them a hard time when the former ask for police help.34)  In addition, Junus, 
a university professor in Surabaya, told me that the police often visit nightclubs and 
discos (which are mostly run by Chinese businesspeople) and ask for a “protection fee.” 
If the owners refuse to pay, the police conduct a raid and threaten to close down the 
premises.35)
It is important to note that Chinese big business or conglomerates and Chinese small 
and medium businesses react and adapt to the corrupt and muddy business environment 
in the post-Suharto era in different ways.  Christian Chua (2008) in his work on Chinese 
big business in post-Suharto Indonesia points out that Chinese big business or conglom-
erates manage to deal with the murky business environment well because they have 
experienced staff to identify and approach the right persons in different political depart-
ments, and sufficient capital to bribe regional decision makers.  The wealth and strong 
social networks of Chinese big businesspeople also enable them to establish close ties 
with local power holders and security forces.  Chua further notes that some Chinese big 
businesspeople establish close links with youth/crime organizations and through such 
connections have their own vigilante groups at their command.  Some control or intimi-
32) Interview with Joko, November 11, 2010.
33) Interview with Erik, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in the iron and plastics industry, 
Medan, August 25, 2010.
34) Personal communication with Yati, former staff of a real estate company in Surabaya’s Chinatown, 
April 8, 2011.
35) Interview with Junus, university professor, Surabaya, January 11, 2011.
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date critical media through financial coercion to ensure favorable reporting on them and 
their business.  In these ways their businesses are well protected.  My study, as will be 
shown with a few examples later in this article, confirms Chua’s research findings that 
Chinese big business or conglomerates are in an advantageous position when dealing 
with the new business environment, which is—paradoxically—more infused with cor-
ruption and uncertainties.  However, as mentioned, my study also shows that Chinese 
businesspeople running small or medium businesses generally do not have the necessary 
economic and social capital to establish close ties with local power holders, local security 
forces, and preman.  Most of them choose to give in to the illegal requests of government 
officials or preman to prevent further hassles.
Changes in Political Environment and Political Activism of Chinese 
 Businesspeople
The opening up of the political space after the fall of Suharto was followed by an explosion 
in the cost of election campaigning.  Therefore, as Chua (2008) reveals in his work, in 
the era of Reformasi, those who want to contest and win in general or local elections need 
to pay large amounts of campaign funds.  Consequently, aspiring power holders need to 
seek harder for the support of rich businesspeople, who can make considerable financial 
contributions to their political activities and campaign fund.  Chinese Indonesian business 
elites are therefore deemed to be important sources of income for political parties that 
need significant electoral campaign funds to win local elections.  In return, the former 
often expect to receive political protection, kickbacks, or other benefits should the can-
didate get elected.  In addition, since the advent of competitive electoral politics, it is too 
risky for Chinese business elites to offer funding for only one particular candidate during 
general elections.  Hence, some hedge their bets by sponsoring more than one candidate, 
thus creating a higher chance that they will have supported someone who will be elected 
into office, whom they can seek favors from.  For example, during the 2004 presidential 
elections, it was alleged that Tomy Winata, the owner of the Artha Graha Group, financed 
the campaigns of both Megawati and Yudhoyono.36)  Chua (ibid.) notes that certain Chi-
36) There were five pairs of candidates contesting in the 2004 presidential election: Wiranto- Solahuddin 
Wahid (nominated by the Party of Functional Groups, Golkar), Megawati Sukarnoputri-Hasyim 
Muzadi (nominated by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P), Amien Rais-Siswono 
Yudo Husodo (nominated by the National Mandate Party, PAN), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf 
Kalla (nominated by the Democrat Party, PD), and Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar (nominated by the 
United Development Party, PPP) (Aris et al. 2005, 71–74).  The Yudhoyono-Kalla pair was elected.
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nese business family members “carefully split their political loyalties” (ibid., 126).  For 
instance, Sofjan Wanandi, the owner of the Gemala Group,37) backed Yudhoyono, while 
his brother, Jusuf Wanandi, who was a board member of the Jakarta Post, used the daily 
to secure support for Megawati.  Mochtar Riady, the founder and owner of the Lippo 
Group,38) backed opposition leaders, while his son, James Riady, supported the actual 
power holders.
My field study in Medan and Surabaya shows similar findings.  For example, Yahya, 
a university professor in Surabaya, disclosed that Alim Markus (林文光), the owner of 
the Maspion Group in the city, funded three out of five pairs of candidates during the first 
direct gubernatorial election in 2008, although he was well connected to only one candi-
date pair: Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf.  The other two candidate pairs were Soenarjo-Ali 
Maschan Moesa and Kholifah Indar-Mudjiono.39)  The election was eventually won by the 
Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf pair.
Likewise, in Medan, according to a Chinese Indonesian city parliamentarian, many 
well-established Chinese businesspeople sponsor candidates (usually incumbents) who 
are deemed to have better chances of winning in general or local elections, in order to 
get political protection for their own business.40)  For instance, during Medan’s mayoral 
election in 2010, although many Chinese big businesspeople funded the Rahudman 
Harahap- Dzulmi Eldin pair as Rahudman was the incumbent acting Medan mayor and 
was deemed to have a higher chance of winning, they also offered to sponsor Sofyan Tan 
(陈金扬), a well-known social activist, who was also the only ethnic Chinese mayoral 
candidate, and his running mate after they won the second-highest number of votes in 
the first round and were qualified to enter the second round.41)  These business elites 
included a well-established real estate tycoon in the city.  Sofyan Tan disclosed that the 
business elites intended to fund him and his running mate in order to obtain business 
favors if the pair won in the second round.42)  Nevertheless, Tan refused their financial 
offers and made it clear that if he were to get elected and become the mayor, he would 
not involve himself in corruption and nepotism.  In addition, he would not grant any favors 
to businesspeople who had sponsored him during the election.  Tan and his running mate 
ended up losing in the second round of elections.
On the other hand, there are also Chinese Indonesian businesspeople who make 
37) The Gemala Group is a conglomerate engaged in automotive and property development businesses.
38) The Lippo Group is a conglomerate engaged in retailing, media, real estate, health care, and finan-
cial businesses.
39) Interview with Yahya, university professor, Surabaya, December 31, 2010.
40) Interview with Hasyim, August 11, 2010.
41) Interview with Sofyan Tan, August 23, 2010; interview with Surya, September 17, 2010.
42) Interview with Sofyan Tan, August 23, 2010.
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use of the democratic environment in the post-Suharto era to directly participate in 
formal politics, and some of them even run for public office.  Rusdi Kirana, Murdaya 
Widyawimatra Poo a.k.a. Poo Tjie Goan (傅志宽) and his wife, Siti Hartati Cakra Murdaya 
a.k.a. Chow Li Ing (邹丽英), and Hary Tanoesoedibjo (陈明立) are examples of Chinese 
big businesspeople or owners of Chinese conglomerates who get involved in politics. 
Kirana is the founder and chief executive officer of Lion Air, Indonesia’s low-cost airline. 
He joined the National Awakening Party (PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), founded by 
former President Abdurrahman Wahid, and was appointed as the vice chairperson of the 
party in January 2014.  He was later appointed as a member of the Presidential Advisory 
Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Presiden) by President Joko Widodo in January 2015 
(Bisnis.com, January 12, 2014; Kompas, January 19, 2015).  Poo and Siti are the founders 
and owners of the CCM Group, a conglomerate engaged in the electric utility, footwear, 
plantation, furniture, and plywood industries.  Poo joined PDI-P, led by Megawati, and 
became the treasurer and financial backer of the party.  He also ran in the 2004 and 2009 
elections and was elected into the national parliament in both, thanks to his financial 
status as a wealthy businessman and the support of well-established Chinese business-
people in Surabaya (Jawa Pos, March 26, 2004; Li 2007, 195; 2010, 122; Detik News, 
December 2, 2009).  In fact, Poo is the only Chinese Indonesian conglomerate owner 
who has been elected into public office since the end of the Suharto regime.  Siti, on the 
other hand, joined the Democratic Party (PD, Partai Demokrat) led by Yudhoyono and 
became his benefactor (The Jakarta Globe, September 12, 2012).  In other words, the Poo 
family members split their political loyalties and financial support between PDI-P and 
PD.  But after the presidential election in 2009, when Yudhoyono was re-elected as 
president, Poo was dismissed from his party membership and his office in the parliament 
by PDI-P as he allegedly channeled his support to Yudhoyono, the incumbent, instead of 
Megawati during the presidential election (Detik News, December 2, 2009).43)  Moreover, 
his wife, Siti, was later charged with bribery by the Jakarta Corruption Court and was 
sentenced to 32 months’ imprisonment in February 2013 (The Jakarta Post, February 5, 
2013).44)
Tanoesoedibjo is the owner of the MNC Group, a media company in Indonesia.  He 
initially joined the National Democratic Party (NasDem, Partai Nasional Demokrat), led 
43) There were three pairs of candidates contesting in the 2009 presidential election: Jusuf Kalla-
Wiranto (nominated by Golkar), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Boediono (nominated by PD), and 
Megawati Sukarnoputri-Prabowo (nominated by PDI-P) (Rizal 2010, 61).
44) However, Siti was granted parole by the Ministry of Justice in September 2014 (The Jakarta Globe, 
September 2, 2014).  The case of the Poo family indicates that splitting political loyalties and finan-
cial support between different political elites does not necessarily bring long-term protection and 
guarantees for the family members’ business or political career.
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by the media tycoon Surya Paloh, but later switched to the People’s Conscience Party 
(Hanura, Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat), led by ex-General Wiranto (Tempo, February 25, 
2013).  Moreover, he decided that he would become Wiranto’s running mate in the 2014 
presidential elections (The Jakarta Post, July 3, 2013).  However, Tanoesoedibjo could 
not fulfill such a wish as Wiranto later decided not to contest in the presidential elections 
(The Jakarta Post, May 18, 2014).  Tanoesoedibjo left Hanura in May 2014 (Tempo, May 
23, 2014).
However, it is worth noting that very few Chinese Indonesians who enter politics 
are well-established big businesspeople or conglomerate owners.  A Chinese big busi-
nessman in Medan revealed that Chinese big businesspeople were usually reluctant to 
participate in formal politics because their businesses were already well established and 
well protected by local power holders or preman.  Furthermore, they were afraid that 
they would make many enemies by getting involved in politics.45)  Therefore, Chinese 
Indonesian businesspeople who get involved in politics are mostly not in big business.
In Medan and Surabaya, there are a few Chinese Indonesian parliamentarians with 
a background in business.  These include Brilian Moktar (莫粧量), North Sumatra pro-
vincial parliamentarian from 2009 to the present; Hasyim a.k.a. Oei Kien Lim (黄建霖), 
Medan city parliamentarian from 2009 to the present; A Hie (王田喜), Medan city par-
liamentarian from 2009 to 2014; Fajar Budianto, East Java provincial parliamentarian 
from 1999 to 2004; Arifli Harbianto Hanurakin (韩明理), Surabaya city parliamentarian 
from 2004 to 2009; Simon Lekatompessy, Surabaya city parliamentarian from 2009 to 
2014; Henky Kurniadi (游经善), national parliamentarian representing East Java 1 (cov-
ering Surabaya and Sidoarjo) from 2014 to the present; and Vinsensius Awey,  Surabaya 
city parliamentarian from 2014 to the present.  They were in small- or medium-scale 
businesses prior to getting elected as parliamentarians.  Moktar was engaged in vehicle 
trading and servicing.46)  Hasyim was a distributor of office stationery.47)  A Hie was a 
hotel owner.48)  Budianto ran a grocery shop in Kembang Jepun, Surabaya.49)  Hanurakin 
owned a bakery shop (Jawa Pos, April 10, 2004).  Lekatompessy was a billboard entre-
45) Interview with Christopher, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in the frozen seafood indus-
try, Medan, August 18, 2010.
46) Interview with Brilian Moktar, member of North Sumatra provincial parliament, 2009–present, 
Medan, July 16, 2010.
47) Interview with Hasyim, August 11, 2010.
48) Interview with Yap Juk Lim, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in the snack production 
industry and chairperson of the Medan Deli Regional Forum of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(FORDA UKM Medan Deli), Medan, November 16, 2010.
49) Interview with Harry Tanudjaja, chairperson, Surabaya branch of the Indonesian Democratic Party 
of Devotion (PKDI); candidate in the 1999 and 2009 general elections; and lawyer, Surabaya, March 
31, 2011.
Local Politics and Chinese Indonesian Business 507
preneur.50)  Kurniadi was a real estate businessman.51)  Awey ran a furniture shop 
 (Surabaya Pagi, September 2, 2014).
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that at present, none of the Chinese Indone-
sian businessmen-turned-politicians have the political standing of Joko Widodo, Jusuf 
Kalla, and Aburizal Bakrie, who were prominent indigenous Indonesian businesspeople. 
Widodo was a furniture entrepreneur before getting involved in politics.  Kalla used to 
be the CEO of NV Hadji Kalla (now known as the Kalla Group), owned by his family.  NV 
Hadji Kalla is a conglomerate engaged in the automotive, property, construction, and 
energy industries.  Bakrie was the former chairperson of the Bakrie Group, a conglomer-
ate with diversified interests across mining, oil and gas, real estate, agriculture, media, 
and telecommunications.  Widodo served as the mayor of Solo from 2005 to 2012 and 
governor of Jakarta from 2012 to 2014, and was elected as the seventh president in 2014. 
Kalla was vice president from 2004 to 2009 and was elected into the same office in the 
2014 presidential election, while Bakrie was the coordinating minister for economy under 
former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.  The fact that no Chinese Indonesian 
businessmen-turned-politicians currently have the political standing of Widodo, Kalla, 
and Bakrie is due mainly to the reluctance of many indigenous Indonesians to fully accept 
Chinese participation in public life.  As Chua puts it, “[T]he label of Chinese would still 
be a barrier” (Chua 2008, 130).  In addition, there have not been any Chinese Indonesians 
in Medan and Surabaya elected as local government heads, who have greater power to 
directly control local resources.
In the following sections, I will explore various illegal or semi-legal business prac-
tices that some Chinese businesspeople utilize to gain wealth and safeguard their busi-
ness interests in the face of the difficult business environment.
Dealing with Power Holders, Police, and Military Commanders
As mentioned earlier, according to some of my informants, most of the Chinese business-
people in Medan and Surabaya—especially those running small and medium businesses—
usually just pay the amount of money or bribes requested by government officials in order 
to get their business permit or other related documents issued on time.  Most of them 
give in to police officers’ illegal requests as well, in order to prevent further problems. 
50) Interview with Simon Lekatompessy, member of the Surabaya city parliament, 2009–14, Surabaya, 
May 5, 2011.
51) Interview with Henky Kurniadi, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in the real estate indus-
try and national parliamentarian representing East Java 1, 2014–present, Surabaya, March 9, 2011.
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Sometimes they try to negotiate with the people who ask for money if the amount 
requested is too large.52)  As mentioned at the beginning of this article, it is alleged that 
even if a businessperson pays all taxes and charges levied on his or her business, tax 
officers still pay a visit to check on his or her business and ask for bribes; even when 
businesspersons pay their taxes honestly, they have to pay more.  So, most Chinese 
businesspeople pay only some of the taxes and charges.  Then when tax officers pay a 
visit to their companies, they just bribe the officers as requested.53)  Johan Tjongiran, an 
ethnic Chinese social activist in Medan, explained such a practice by giving an example:
For instance, if a businessperson needs to pay Rp.500 million of taxes, the officers would normally 
ask him or her to pay only Rp.250 million and they would keep Rp.220 million for themselves, and 
submit only Rp.30 million to the government.54)
Therefore, Susanto, the ethnic Chinese toy distributor in Medan mentioned in the 
opening story of this article, argues that:
The wealthiest people in Indonesia are in fact not ethnic Chinese businesspeople but indigenous 
bureaucrats in the central and local governments like Gayus Tambunan.55)  They become extremely 
rich after getting many bribes from businesspeople.  Their children often spend time shopping in 
Singapore and bringing back many branded luxury goods to Indonesia.56)
Following Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and field, I argue that most Chinese busi-
nesspeople choose to give in to the illegal requests of government officials, police, and 
preman not only due to their reluctance to run into more trouble and their fear of the 
hassle of fighting back, but also because they have enough economic capital to pay bribes 
and extortion to protect their business and avoid further trouble.  This is in line with 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and field that social actors well endowed with capital tend 
to defend the status quo of the field (social structure) they are in, in order to safeguard 
their capital.
Although there are also Chinese businesspeople who refuse to be extorted by the 
52) Interview with Daniel (deceased), July 13, 2010; interview with Johan Tjongiran, August 3, 2010; 
interview with Susanto, August 4, 2010; interview with Atan, an ethnic Chinese businessperson 
engaged in the real estate industry and a developer-cum-contractor, Surabaya, February 28, 2011.
53) Interview with Johan Tjongiran, August 3, 2010; interview with Susanto, August 4, 2010.
54) Interview with Johan Tjongiran, August 3, 2010.
55) Gayus Tambunan is a former tax official who was arrested by police on March 30, 2010, for alleged 
tax evasion of Rp.25 billion (see ANTARA News, March 27, 2010; March 31, 2010).  Although 
Tambunan is of Batak origin, an ethnic minority group in Indonesia, his ethnicity is never prob-
lematized by the public because Batak are one of the indigenous groups in the country.
56) Interview with Susanto, August 4, 2010.
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police and choose to get themselves organized and protest against the extortion, such 
people are rare.  These businesspeople often do not have the necessary economic capital 
to pay the bribes and extortion.  They therefore decide to protest against the extortion 
in order to safeguard their business.  This is in line with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and 
field that social actors least endowed with capital are inclined to challenge the status quo 
of the field (social structure) they are in.  One well-known example is Yap Juk Lim (叶
郁林), a Chinese businessperson engaged in the snack production industry near Jalan 
Metal, Medan.  Yap used to have to pay the police Rp.300,000–400,000 every time they 
visited his factory.  Eventually, he could not bear the extortion; and in 2007 he refused 
to pay.  As a result, the police alleged that his factory used expired ingredients in snack 
production and detained him for eight days.57)  As noted in a news report in Waspada, the 
Medan branch of the Regional Forum of Small and Medium Enterprises (FORDA UKM, 
Forum Daerah Usaha Kecil dan Menengah) supported Yap and launched a public protest 
together with other small and medium businesspeople from different ethnic backgrounds 
on March 25, 2008 (Waspada, March 25, 2008).  The protest took place in front of the 
North Sumatra Police Headquarters, governor’s office, mayor’s office, provincial parlia-
ment, and Medan city parliament.  The approximately 2,000 people who joined the protest 
demanded that the police stop extorting small and medium businesspeople.58)  According 
to Yap, after the protest the police officers stopped harassing the factories around Jalan 
Metal for a long time.  In 2010, however, they began to again visit some factories in that 
area, asking for payments; Yap’s factory, however, was free from the harassment.59)  This 
indicates that the police recognized that Yap would fight back if they tried to extort him.
Sofyan Tan, a candidate in Medan’s 2010 mayoral election, revealed that many local 
Chinese businesspeople viewed Yap’s action positively, although it was not a common 
practice among Chinese businesspeople.60)  Yap talked about the reluctance of most 
Chinese businesspeople to fight against extortion by government officials and police, and 
their reluctance to spend time getting themselves organized:
We have to get ourselves organized if we want to fight against such illegal requests.  Many Chinese 
businesspeople regard this as time-consuming and would rather give in to illegal requests of gov-
ernment officials and police to avoid any further problems.61)
Another Chinese businessperson made a similar remark: “The Chinese are gener-
57) Interview with Yap Juk Lim, November 16, 2010.
58) Interview with Yap Juk Lim, November 16, 2010.
59) Interview with Yap Juk Lim, November 16, 2010.
60) Interview with Sofyan Tan, August 23, 2010.
61) Interview with Yap Juk Lim, November 16, 2010.
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ally afraid of getting in trouble.  If paying money to those extorting them can save them 
from further trouble, they will just pay the money instead of fighting back.”62)
In short, most Chinese businesspeople prefer to give in to the illegal requests of 
government officials and police because they are afraid of the hassle of fighting back, and 
of the trouble it is likely to cause them.  Moreover, they have the necessary economic 
capital to pay the bribes and extortion to protect their business and save them from 
further troubles.  Very few of them choose to fight against the extortion, because they 
feel that getting themselves organized to fight back is time consuming.  By giving in to 
the illegal requests, Chinese businesspeople continue to make themselves the targets 
of extortion and perpetuate a corrupt, predatory political-business system.
Additionally, in order to obtain protection for their businesses, many well- established 
Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in Medan and Surabaya have utilized their social 
capital to establish close relationships with heads of security forces.  The following quo-
tation from an interview and the excerpts from a Chinese-language newspaper report on 
a welcome and farewell dinner for the East Java Regional Military Command in 2010 
illustrate such political-business relationships between local Chinese Indonesian business 
elites and heads of security forces in both cities:
The ceremony of North Sumatra police chief transfers was held recently [in March 2010].  I was 
there too.  [Do you] want to know who most of the attendees were?  About 90 percent of them 
were Chinese big businesspeople!63)
East Java Entrepreneur Charitable Foundation, Surabaya Chinese Association (PMTS, Paguyuban 
Masyarakat Tionghoa Surabaya), and Chinese community leaders jointly organized a welcome and 
farewell dinner for the East Java Regional Military Command on October 6 at 7pm.  The event was 
held at the Grand Ballroom of Shangri-La Hotel, Surabaya.
During the dinner, Alim Markus [president of East Java Entrepreneur Charitable Foundation and 
PMTS] delivered his speech with enthusiasm: “Thanks to the mercy of the Lord, tonight we have 
the opportunity to get together with the former and new military commanders of East Java.  On 
behalf of the Chinese community in Surabaya, I would like to wish our former military commander 
[Suwarno] all the best in his future endeavors.  I would also like to call upon the Chinese com-
munity to cooperate with the new military commander [Gatot]. (Medan Zao Bao, October 9, 2010, 
my translation from the Chinese original)
As referred to in the excerpt from the Chinese-language newspaper report above, 
the local Chinese business community in Surabaya led by Alim Markus (林文光) organ-
ized a welcome and farewell dinner for the former and new regional military commander 
62) Interview with Ivan, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in real estate, Medan, July 16, 2010.
63) Interview with Usman, NGO activist, Medan, July 30, 2010.
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of East Java in 2010.  Junus, one of my informants—a university professor in Surabaya—
revealed that Markus was well connected with President Suharto during the New Order. 
After the collapse of the Suharto regime, Markus established close ties with Imam Utomo, 
the then governor of East Java.64)  Markus is the owner of Maspion Group, a Surabaya-
based conglomerate that manufactures household appliances.
Many well-established Chinese businesspeople in Surabaya have also established 
close relationships with the governor, the regional police chief (Kapolda, Kepala Polisi 
Daerah), and the regional military commander (Pangdam, Panglima Daerah Militer), all 
of whom are paid by the former on a regular basis.65)  Bambang, a Chinese big business-
man whom I interviewed, disclosed that he was a good friend of Soekarwo, the governor 
of East Java.  Bambang owns a ceramic tile factory.66)  Junus, who knows many local 
Chinese businesspeople, commented that Bambang is free from harassment and extortion 
by the police due to his good relationship with the governor.67)  A few well-established 
Chinese businesspeople who run nightclubs in the city are well connected to the mayor 
and local police.  Therefore, their businesses are protected and their clubs are free from 
police raids.68)
It is alleged that some Chinese businesspeople who run big businesses in Surabaya 
are connected to Anton Prijatno (王炳金), a Golkar member who served in the East Java 
provincial legislature and the national legislature (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) dur-
ing the Suharto era, and later, after the end of the New Order, became a prominent 
businessman and political patron for many Chinese businesses in Surabaya.69)  In my 
interview with him, Prijatno revealed that he left Golkar in May 1998 because he was 
very disappointed with the rampant corruption within the Suharto regime.70)  Unlike most 
local Chinese politicians with business backgrounds, Prijatno became actively engaged 
in business only after spending many years in politics.  He became the chairperson of 
an asphalt distribution company in 2003.71)  Since Prijatno is close to the governor, his 
business flourishes and is protected from harassment and extortion by the police.  He is 
64) Interview with Junus, January 11, 2011.
65) Interview with Junus, January 11, 2011.
66) Interview with Bambang, an ethnic Chinese ceramic tile factory owner, Surabaya, March 3, 2011.
67) Interview with Junus, January 11, 2011.
68) Interview with Junus, January 11, 2011.
69) Interview with Junus, January 11, 2011.  Prijatno was a member of the East Java provincial legisla-
ture from 1977 to 1987 and a member of the national legislature from 1987 to 1997 (interview with 
Anton Prijatno, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in the distribution of asphalt; a former 
member of the East Java provincial legislature, 1977–87; and a former member of the national 
legislature, 1987–97, Surabaya, February 24, 2011).
70) Interview with Anton Prijatno, February 24, 2011.
71) Interview with Anton Prijatno, February 24, 2011.
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also a business partner of Sudomo Mergonoto (吴德辉), who owns Kapal Api Group, a 
coffee production company, and Bambang (the ceramic tile factory owner).72)  In addition, 
 Prijatno is a supplier of asphalt for many well-established Chinese real estate developers 
and contractors in the city.73)  Since he is a prominent politician and close to the governor, 
it is alleged that he also acts as a political patron for most well-established Chinese 
businesses in Surabaya, except Markus’s Maspion Group, the largest conglomerate in 
 Surabaya.74)
Similarly, in Medan, according to a local media activist who knows many local busi-
nesspeople of Chinese descent, in order to obtain protection and privileged access to 
permits and contracts from local power holders, many well-established Chinese Indone-
sian businesspeople in the city have established close relationships with local power 
holders and heads of security forces who hold the most power in North Sumatra, i.e., the 
governor, the regional police chief, and the regional military commander.  They often 
group together to “contribute” money to those power holders and heads of security forces 
in exchange for protection and permits.75)  Another NGO activist disclosed that it is com-
mon for Chinese businesspeople who operate big businesses in the city to group together 
and form close ties with local police officers.  They pay money to the police regularly in 
exchange for protection.76)
Benny Basri (张保圆) is a good example of a well-connected Chinese businessman 
in Medan.  Running PT Central Business District (CBD), a well-established real estate 
company in the city, Basri is said to be close to regional military officers and local police 
officers.77)  He has also held the position of treasurer in the North Sumatra branch of the 
Democratic Party (PD, Partai Demokrat) since 2003.78)  It is alleged that because of his 
close relationship with local power holders, he was able to purchase land previously 
owned by the Indonesian Air Force in Polonia, Medan, for a real estate development 
project.79)
While Chinese businesspeople who run large-scale businesses are able to establish 
close ties with local power holders and heads of security forces because they have a 
strong social network, those who own small- and medium-scale businesses generally do 
72) Interview with Junus, January 11, 2011.
73) Interview with Anton Prijatno, February 24, 2011.
74) Interview with Junus, January 11, 2011.
75) Interview with Daniel (deceased), September 17, 2010.
76) Interview with Joko, November 11, 2010.
77) Interview with Usman, July 30, 2010; interview with Christopher, August 18, 2010; interview with 
Joko, November 11, 2010.
78) Interview with Sofyan Tan, August 23, 2010; interview with Joko, November 11, 2010.
79) Interview with Usman, July 30, 2010.
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not have the ability and opportunity to establish close ties with local or potential power 
holders.
Relations with Preman
As mentioned, institutionalized gangsterism is dominant in Medan.  Some local Chinese 
businesspeople who run large-scale businesses have established close relationships with 
youth/crime organizations to get protection for their business.  According to an NGO 
activist in Medan, many well-established Chinese businesspeople hire preman to protect 
their business and to break up strikes.80)  Some of them have also become advisers of 
youth/crime organizations.  For instance, one of my informants disclosed that Vincent 
Wijaya, a local Chinese businessperson engaged in the frozen seafood industry, was an 
adviser of PP’s North Sumatra branch, a major youth/crime organization in the province, 
and hence his business was well protected by PP.81)  In addition, according to the person 
in charge of Harian Promosi Indonesia (《印广日报》), a Chinese-language press in Medan, 
the founder of the press, Hakim Honggandhi (关健康), used to be the treasurer of IPK, 
a youth/crime organization based in Medan.  Honggandhi was also connected to the North 
Sumatran military because he used to distribute consumer goods to them.82)
Another good example is the support that Indra Wahidin (黄印华), the then chair-
person of the North Sumatra branch of the Chinese Indonesian Association, and a group 
of Chinese community leaders (who were mostly businesspeople) gave to Ajib Shah-
Binsar Situmorang, one of the candidate pairs in Medan’s 2010 mayoral election (Harian 
Global, March 30, 2010; Harian Analisa, May 7, 2010; Waspada, May 7, 2010).83)  Wahidin 
is an insurance agent and paint distributor.84)  He openly supported Ajib-Binsar because 
of his connections with Ajib, the former chairperson of PP’s North Sumatra branch. 
Wahidin and several other Chinese businesspeople, some said, believed Ajib would offer 
more protection to their business if he was elected,85) as opposed to Sofyan Tan (the only 
80) Interview with Halim, July 26, 2010.
81) Interview with Joko, November 11, 2010.
82) As Harian Promosi Indonesia had been running at a loss due to low readership, Honggandhi even-
tually lost all of the capital he had invested in the press.  He later moved to Jakarta and worked in 
a hotel (interview with Setiawan, person in charge, Harian Promosi Indonesia [《印广日报》], Medan, 
November 8, 2010).
83) For more details of Medan’s 2010 mayoral election, see Aspinall et al. (2011).
84) Interview with Christopher, August 18, 2010.
85) Interview with Farid, an ethnic Chinese businessperson engaged in the garment production indus-
try, Medan, July 15, 2010; interview with Ivan, July 16, 2010.
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ethnic Chinese mayoral candidate), who refused to promise any favors to those who sup-
ported his candidature.86)  One informant, however, has a different interpretation of this 
support: that Wahidin supported Ajib in order to secure the safety of the local Chinese 
community.  This is because Ajib was initially the candidate chosen by the Prosperous 
Peace Party (PDS, Partai Damai Sejahtera), but the party later revoked its support in 
favor of Sofyan Tan.  Since Wahidin was afraid that Ajib would blame the local Chinese 
community for this turnaround and make trouble for them, he decided to openly support 
and campaign for Ajib.87)
Besides that, according to some of my informants, the local governments of post-
New Order Medan/North Sumatra often allocate local state projects to indigenous con-
tractors who are members of youth/crime organizations.88)  But it is also not uncommon 
for them to subcontract some of their projects to Chinese contractors who are their 
friends.  An indigenous contractor may subcontract his projects to his Chinese friends at 
20 percent less than his original tender cost.  What this means is that the contractor would 
get a 20 percent cut from the cost.89)  In other words, some local Chinese businesspeople 
who are well connected with youth/crime organizations could informally work on local 
state projects.
Conversely, in Surabaya, the relations between Chinese businesspeople and preman 
are different since the youth/crime organizations there are much less dominant.  As 
mentioned, Chinese businesspeople in Surabaya often pay Madurese preman in exchange 
for “protection” for their business premises.  In addition, during workers’ strikes, Chi-
nese Indonesian industrialists often hire Madurese preman or members of Banser, the 
vigilante corps of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), to apply pressure on striking workers.  With 
regard to the allocation of local state projects, according to a university professor in 
Surabaya, unlike in Medan, contractors who get local state projects in Surabaya are not 
necessarily members of youth/crime organizations, since such organizations are less 
dominant in the city.  However, these contractors are generally well connected to local 
decision makers.90)  A Chinese Indonesian politician-turned-businessman in Surabaya 
disclosed that during the New Order era, the local government of Surabaya often allocated 
state projects to indigenous Indonesian contractors; very few Chinese Indonesian con-
tractors got the projects.  Hence, it was common for indigenous contractors to subcon-
86) Interview with Sofyan Tan, August 23, 2010.
87) This interpretation was given by Surya, a media activist in Medan (interview with Surya, September 
17, 2010).
88) Interview with Ivan, July 16, 2010; interview with Halim, July 26, 2010.
89) Interview with Halim, July 26, 2010.
90) Interview with Junus, January 11, 2011.
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tract some of their projects to Chinese contractors.  But since the end of the New Order, 
the local government of Surabaya has become more open and less discriminative: about 
50 percent of contractors who get state projects are well-established Chinese contrac-
tors.91)  Therefore, in the Reformasi era, very few Chinese contractors in Surabaya work 
on state projects that are subcontracted by indigenous contractors.  This is certainly very 
different from the triangular collusion (Chinese contractors-youth/crime organizations-
local government officials) that their Chinese counterparts in Medan have developed.
Financial Coercion against the Media
After the unraveling of the Suharto regime in May 1998, many discriminatory measures 
against the Chinese were removed.  Most significantly, Suharto’s policy of forced assim-
ilation was abandoned.92)  In 2001 President Wahid sanctioned the publication of Chinese-
language print media through the repealing of laws that had prohibited the local publica-
tion of Chinese characters in Indonesia since 1965, and thus Chinese-language materials 
became more freely available.  Many schools were allowed to conduct Chinese-language 
courses.  Besides that, ethnic Chinese were allowed to openly celebrate Chinese festivals 
(Turner 2003, 347–348; Hoon 2008, 104).
The advent of democratization and the removal of restrictions on Chinese cultural 
expression brought about press freedom and a new beginning for Chinese-language 
presses in Indonesia.  Several Chinese-language presses were established across the 
country after the end of the New Order.  In Medan, five Chinese-language presses were 
established after the end of the Suharto regime: Harian Promosi Indonesia (《印广日报》), 
Su Bei Ri Bao (《苏北日报》), Xun Bao (《讯报》), Hao Bao (《好报》), and Zheng Bao Daily 
(《正报》).  All of them except Harian Promosi Indonesia are still in business at the time 
of writing.  Harian Promosi Indonesia ceased publication at the end of December 2014 
due to low readership.  It was later re-launched under a new name, Zheng Bao Daily, in 
February 2015 (Zheng Bao Daily, February 16, 2015).  In Surabaya, four Chinese-language 
presses were established in the post-Suharto era: Harian Naga Surya (《龙阳日报》), 
Harian Nusantara (《千岛日报》), Rela Warta (《诚报》), and Si Shui Chen Bao (《泗水晨
报》).93)  However, Harian Naga Surya and Rela Warta ceased publication after a few years 
91) Interview with Anton Prijatno, February 24, 2011.
92) For a background to Suharto’s policy of forced assimilation, see Suryadinata (1992) and Coppel 
(1983).
93) Si Shui Chen Bao is a subsidiary paper of Guo Ji Ri Bao, the largest Chinese-language daily in 
Jakarta.
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due to various reasons.94)
It is worth noting that press freedom appears to be a double-edged sword for Chinese 
businesspeople.  On the one hand, Chinese businesspeople can establish Chinese- 
language presses to promote Chinese culture and discuss issues related to ethnic Chinese 
in Indonesian society.  They can also use the presses as a cultural space to showcase 
themselves and their business.  But on the other hand, press freedom allows the media 
to expose the corrupt practices of Chinese businesspeople and the politicians to whom 
they are connected.
Chinese-language presses in Medan and Surabaya generally run at a loss due to low 
readership.  The prohibition of Chinese-language education in New Order Indonesia 
produced a younger generation of Chinese who are mostly Chinese illiterate.  Therefore, 
there is no general readership beyond the older generation, and this leads to a diminish-
ing market.95)  The presses need to depend on the financial support of local Chinese 
businesspeople in order to survive.  Some well-established Chinese businesspeople sup-
port Chinese-language presses in Medan and Surabaya by becoming their shareholders 
or advertisers.  In this way, they also make sure that the presses report in favor of them 
and their business.  Such patrimonial power relations between Chinese-language presses 
and well-established Chinese businesspeople have deterred the presses from reporting 
negative news about local Chinese businesses.  Therefore, news about corrupt business 
practices involving Chinese businesspeople is rarely reported in local Chinese-language 
presses.  For instance, in October 2010, while Indonesian-language newspapers in Medan 
such as Waspada and Harian Orbit covered the alleged tax evasion by PT Indo Palapa, a 
real estate company owned by Benny Basri, an ethnic Chinese real estate tycoon in the 
city, most of the local Chinese-language newspapers did not report on the case.  PT Indo 
Palapa allegedly submitted false information to the tax offices in the city about the num-
ber of shophouses that had been built by the company, so as to avoid paying taxes.96) 
When Xun Bao later published a news report on the case, it did not mention the name of 
Benny Basri.97)
Chinese businesspeople who fund Chinese-language presses are mostly connected 
to national- and local-level power holders.  In order to survive, the presses must refrain 
from being critical of these power holders, otherwise they might encounter a withdrawal 
94) The closing down of Rela Warta was due mainly to the withdrawal of advertising by its main adver-
tiser.  The closing down of Harian Naga Surya was due to low readership.  For more details, see 
Huang (2005).
95) Interviews with people in charge and staff of local Chinese-language presses in Medan and Surabaya.
96) See Harian Orbit (October 15, 2010) and Waspada (October 15, 2010).
97) See Xun Bao (November 2, 2010).
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of their funders’ sponsorship.  The fate of Rela Warta (《诚报》) in Surabaya vividly illus-
trates the carrot-and-stick method used on a critical press.  Rela Warta was the only 
Chinese-language newspaper in Surabaya that did not cover many of the sociocultural 
activities organized by local Chinese organizations.  It was also the only Chinese-language 
newspaper that often published in-depth and critical editorials and opinion pieces on 
 current affairs and politics in Indonesia.  The newspaper published a few editorials and 
opinion pieces on the general election and the role of Chinese Indonesian voters during 
the 2004 parliamentary election.98)  It also published news on Dédé Oetomo (温忠孝), an 
ethnic Chinese social activist in Surabaya who contested in the East Java regional repre-
sentative council (DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) election in 2004.99)
Shortly after the 2004 election, Rela Warta suddenly announced that it would turn 
into a weekly paper due to low readership and the increase in printing price (Rela Warta, 
April 8, 2004).100)  But according to the former person in charge of the newspaper, the 
change was actually due to the main advertiser’s decision to stop advertising in the 
newspaper after the editorial team refused to openly support Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
the soon-to-be presidential candidate at that time, as requested by the main advertiser. 
The main advertiser was a member of the Chinese business elite who ran various types 
of business in East Java.  He had been contributing Rp.2 million in advertising fees to the 
newspaper every month.  Prior to the polls, the main advertiser, who was close to 
 Yudhoyono, urged Rela Warta to openly support Yudhoyono and call upon the local 
 Chinese community to do the same.  But the newspaper’s editorial team refused to do 
so because they maintained that the Chinese community had the right to support any 
electoral candidate they liked.  In addition, the newspaper published a few news articles 
that were critical of Yudhoyono prior to the election.  The main advertiser was upset and 
subsequently decided to withdraw his regular contribution of advertisements to the news-
paper.  Moreover, he urged other local Chinese business elites to boycott the newspaper. 
Consequently, Rela Warta lost many subscribers and a considerable amount of advertis-
ing revenue.  Therefore, shortly after the parliamentary election, the founders decided 
to turn Rela Warta into a weekly paper.101)  But even after the weekly circulation of the 
paper was reduced to 2,000 copies, the publication continued to lose money.  Later, in 
June 2007, Rela Warta was taken over by the East Java branch of the Chinese Indonesian 
Social Association (PSMTI, Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia), led by Jos 
98) For examples, see Rela Warta (March 11, 2004; April 2, 2004; April 3, 2004; June 25–July 1, 2004).
99) For example, see Rela Warta (March 3, 2004).
100) See also Li (2008, 360).
101) Interview with Samas H. Widjaja, former chief editor, Rela Warta (《诚报》), and former adviser, 
Harian Naga Surya (《龙阳日报》), Surabaya, May 5, 2011.
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Soetomo (江庆德), and became the bulletin of the organization (Li 2008, 360).  In 2009, 
the paper ceased publication as it was no longer supported by PSMTI’s East Java branch 
(ibid.).102)
The decline of Rela Warta clearly shows that some Chinese business elites do not 
hesitate to resort to financial coercion against a media outlet in order to safeguard their 
business interests.  It also shows that it is extremely difficult to establish and maintain a 
Chinese-language press without financial support from the Chinese business community. 
Without the money, it is impossible for a press to survive in the long term.  This illus-
trates the ambivalence of press freedom for the Chinese in the post-Suharto era.  The 
patrimonial power relations between local Chinese-language presses and Chinese busi-
ness elites in Medan and Surabaya have also played an important role in shaping local 
politics, which is infused with corruption.
Land Disputes in Medan and Threats against Chinese Indonesians
Due to the absence of a well-established rule of law before and after the end of the New 
Order, there have been several cases of land disputes involving illegal seizure of state 
and residential land by real estate developers, who are mostly Chinese Indonesians. 
However, as I will discuss later in this section, land disputes in Medan tend to turn into 
violent conflicts and threats against Chinese Indonesians.  Conversely, violent conflicts 
and threats against Chinese Indonesians related to land disputes rarely occur in Surabaya, 
due to two reasons.  The first has much to do with the interethnic relationships between 
Chinese and indigenous Indonesians in these two cities.  According to Judith Nagata 
(2003, 375), Medan has a long history of tensions between local Chinese and local indig-
enous groups.  The use of Hokkien, a Chinese dialect originating from the southern part 
of Fujian Province in China, among Chinese in Medan creates a gulf between them and 
indigenous Indonesians.  The Chinese are also considered wealthier and often encounter 
opposition and antagonism from indigenous Indonesians.103)  The situation is quite differ-
ent in Surabaya; according to an article in Gatra magazine (July 18, 1998), and also men-
tioned in an interview with Dédé Oetomo—an ethnic Chinese social activist in Surabaya 
—Chinese in Surabaya, who often speak Indonesian instead of Chinese languages, gener-
ally maintain a good relationship with indigenous Indonesians.104)  This good relationship 
102) PSMTI is a major ethnic Chinese organization formed in Indonesia after the end of the New Order.
103) In fact, Medan was the site of the first violence against Chinese in May 1998 (Purdey 2006, 114).
104) Interview with Dédé Oetomo, December 24, 2010.
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is due also to the dominance of NU in East Java.  According to Suhaimi, a university 
lecturer in Surabaya, NU is a mass-based Muslim organization that embraces moderate 
Islam and emphasizes tolerance for minorities, including the Chinese minority.  Its teach-
ings have influenced many East Javanese Muslims.105)  A second reason has much to do 
with the way the local government and developers in Surabaya deal with land disputes. 
As Howard W. Dick notes in his book on Surabaya, the local government and developers 
in the city prefer negotiation to violence in dealing with land disputes.  Prompt resettle-
ment with a higher rate of compensation is the usual compromise (Dick 2003, 406).  In 
other words, residents in Surabaya enjoy better institutional protection compared to 
those in Medan.  Hence, land disputes in Surabaya seldom turn into threats against  ethnic 
Chinese Indonesians.
There are a few land disputes involving Chinese Indonesian real estate developers 
in Medan that I want to showcase here to show how some Chinese Indonesian develop-
ers have willingly resorted to illegal practices to further their business interests.  These 
cases have received fairly high coverage in the local and national press and have kept 
alive the general national view of Chinese Indonesians as being collusive and willing to 
engage in corruption to maintain their wealth.
In November and December 2011, Indonesian-language newspapers in Medan 
reported that three ethnic Chinese tycoons had been implicated in the illegal seizure of 
state and residential land in the city.  The tycoons involved were Benny Basri (张保圆), 
Tamin Sukardi, and Mujianto (郑祥南).  All of them were real estate developers (Harian 
Sumut Pos, November 8, 2011; November 9, 2011; Harian Orbit, November 17, 2011; 
November 30, 2011; December 5, 2011; December 7, 2011).  It was alleged that they had 
managed to take over the land by bribing local government bureaucrats.  Basri, the owner 
of PT Central Business District (CBD), was alleged to have obtained the land title for 
Sari Rejo Sub-district (Kelurahan Sari Rejo) through illegal means.  The land was previ-
ously under the ownership of the Indonesian Air Force, but it had later become a resi-
dential area.  However, residents who had been living in Sari Rejo for decades did not 
get their land title, while Basri managed to get it within a short period of time and planned 
to turn the land into a commercial property.  In other words, the ownership of the land 
had been transferred from the air force to Basri’s company.
As mentioned earlier in this article, Basri was a real estate tycoon well connected 
to local power holders and local military as well as police officers.  He was also the trea-
surer of PD’s North Sumatra branch since 2003.  So, it was quite possible that Basri 
managed to take over the land in Sari Rejo within a short period of time because of his 
105) Interview with Suhaimi, university lecturer, Surabaya, April 27, 2011.
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close association with local power holders and officers at the local air force base.
Both Sukardi and Mujianto were implicated in land seizures at Helvetia, Deliserdang 
Regency (Kabupaten Deliserdang), North Sumatra.  Sukardi, the owner of PT Erniputra 
Terari, had taken over former state land in Helvetia for commercial purposes.  The land 
was earlier given by the state to the residents of Helvetia.  Sukardi was allegedly involved 
in the hiring of gangsters to kidnap and assault an NGO activist who led residents of 
Helvetia to defend their land rights.  The activist was later released, after being repeat-
edly assaulted by gangsters for several hours.  Mujianto, the owner of Agung Cemara 
Realty, was implicated in the seizure of another piece of former state land in Helvetia in 
1968.  The land had been given to residents of Helvetia, who later turned it into a football 
field.  According to a local social activist, as cited in Harian Orbit, Mujianto suddenly 
claimed ownership of the land in 2011 with a title deed.  Although the title deed did not 
show the correct address of the land, Mujianto still fenced the land with the help of the 
police to prevent residents from entering.  Therefore, the activist believed the incident 
was “a game of land mafia” with the collusion of government officials (Harian Orbit, 
November 30, 2011, my translation from the Indonesian original).  As a result, the resi-
dents could no longer use the field for leisure and exercise.  This angered the residents, 
and they subsequently demolished the fence, leading to a clash between the residents 
and gangsters hired by Mujianto.  Police officers showed up during the clash; but instead 
of protecting the residents, they joined the gangsters in attacking the residents.  Several 
residents were injured in the confrontation.
The land disputes in Helvetia drew the attention of a few North Sumatra provincial 
parliamentarians, who paid a visit to the site of the land disputes on April 9, 2013.  They 
promised to hold a meeting with the residents to discuss the issue and a search for a 
solution.  By June 2013 the promise had not yet been fulfilled, so on June 7, 2013, the 
Islamic organization Al Washliyah, which owned land in Helvetia that had been taken 
over by Sukardi, officially lodged a complaint with the Corruption Eradication Commis-
sion (KPK, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi) about Sukardi’s seizure of land in Helvetia. 
Apart from protesting against Sukardi in front of his office, members of Al Washliyah also 
held demonstrations in front of the North Sumatra chief attorney’s office and the North 
Sumatra High Court, urging law enforcers to take action against Sukardi (Harian Orbit, 
June 10, 2013).  The protesters carried a coffin when they protested again outside 
 Sukardi’s office on June 24, 2013 (Harian Orbit, June 25, 2013).
Harian Orbit referred to the three developers as “slanted-eye businesspeople” 
 (pengusaha mata cipit), clearly indicating their Chinese ethnicity, since it was common 
for non-Chinese in Indonesia to refer to the Chinese as “slanted-eye” or mata cipit 
 (Harian Orbit, December 5, 2011).  To some extent, the alleged involvement of the three 
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Chinese developers in land disputes reinforced the stereotypes of Chinese business-
people as being heartless, corrupt, and opportunistic.
On another occasion, PT Jatimasindo, a real estate company owned by Arsyad Lis, 
another ethnic Chinese tycoon in Medan, was involved in the demolition of the Raudhatul 
Islam Mosque in Medan on April 11, 2011 (Suara Nasional News, January 30, 2013).  The 
mosque was situated behind Emerald Garden Hotel, which was also owned by Lis. 
According to the chairperson of the Muslim People’s Forum (FUI, Forum Umat Islam),106) 
Indra Suheri, as interviewed by the Jakarta Post, the demolition of the mosque was to 
make way for the establishment of a shopping mall and a housing complex (The Jakarta 
Post, January 28, 2012).  The company carried out the demolition after getting approval 
from Medan’s Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars (MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia). 
Suheri accused Medan’s MUI of gaining material benefits at the expense of a mosque 
(Harian Orbit, February 7, 2012).  Since then, FUI and several local Islamic activists have 
staged demonstrations in front of Emerald Garden Hotel from time to time.  In early 
February 2012, banners with the provocative words “[Kalau] 1 mesjid lagi digusurr.1000 
rumah cina kami bakarr!” (If one more mosque is demolished, we will burn 1,000 Chinese 
houses!) were even displayed during the demonstrations.  It was also rumored that the 
protesters carried out sweeping raids on every car passing the area and asked the drivers 
to lower the car window.  Although the sweeping never really occurred, the rumor—
which was circulated via mobile phone text messages in Medan—caused panic among 
local Chinese in the city (Tribun Medan, February 4, 2012).
Later, in February 2013, PT Jatimasindo promised to rebuild the mosque at the same 
location.  But as of May 2014, the company had not yet provided the rebuilding funds, 
and this was perceived by local Islamic activists as breaking the promise.  So, the activists 
continued to stage open demonstrations in front of the Emerald Garden Hotel (Harian 
Sumut Pos, March 23, 2013; Harian Andalas, May 17, 2014).
At the time of writing, there has been no further news on land disputes involving 
the above Chinese tycoons.
The Chinese Indonesian developers’ involvement in land disputes not only violated 
the land rights of local communities but also perpetuated the corrupt, predatory political-
business system in Medan.  In addition, their alleged corrupt business practices rein-
forced the negative perception of ethnic Chinese among indigenous Indonesians, and this 
sometimes led to violence and threats against Chinese Indonesians.
106) Muslim People’s Forum is an Islamic organization in Indonesia.
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Conclusion
The corrupt local politics and murky business environment in post-Suharto Indonesia 
are the result of corrupt practices and internal mismanagement that continue to charac-
terize the bureaucracy in the country.  This study shows that Chinese big business or 
conglomerates and Chinese small and medium businesses react and adapt to such a 
political-business environment in different ways.  Chinese big businesses or conglomer-
ates have experienced staff to identify and approach the right persons in different politi-
cal departments as well as sufficient capital to bribe regional decision makers.  Moreover, 
Chinese big businesspeople utilize their wealth and strong social networks to establish 
close ties with local power holders, security forces, and youth/crime organizations.  Some 
control or intimidate critical media through financial coercion.  In other words, Chinese 
big businesses or conglomerates are in an advantageous position in dealing with the cor-
rupt and muddy business environment.  Chinese businesspeople running small or medium 
businesses, however, generally do not have the necessary economic and social capital to 
establish close ties with local power holders, security forces, and youth/crime organiza-
tions.  Most of them just choose to give in to the illegal requests of government officials 
or preman to prevent further hassles.  On the other hand, there have been a few Chinese 
Indonesian businesspeople getting involved in politics and being elected as parliamentar-
ians after the opening up of a democratic political space.  However, I argue that the 
political power of Chinese Indonesians in Medan and Surabaya is overall still limited, 
because there have not been any Chinese Indonesians elected as local government heads, 
who have more power to directly control local resources.
It is important to note that all the different semi-legal and illegal means utilized by 
Chinese Indonesian businesspeople in dealing with the new political-business environ-
ment have perpetuated and reproduced the corrupt, predatory political-business system. 
By giving in to the illegal requests of power holders, police, and preman, Chinese busi-
nesspeople have colluded in and indirectly perpetuated such corrupt practices, as well 
as reinforced the stereotype that the Chinese can pay, will pay, and should pay for every-
thing, including a peaceful business environment.  By colluding with local power holders, 
heads of security forces, and youth/crime organizations to get protection and access to 
permits and contracts, Chinese businesspeople have directly become an integral part of 
the problematic political-business relationships and the local politics infused with cor-
ruption and institutionalized gangsterism.  Although there are a few Chinese business-
people who refuse to become victims of extortion and choose to fight back, these appear 
to be rare.  By intimidating critical media through financial coercion, Chinese business-
people have seriously threatened press freedom in post-Suharto Indonesia.  Such a 
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problematic political-business system is a vicious circle: Following Giddens’s structure-
agency theory, corrupt local politics in post-Suharto Indonesia prompts Chinese busi-
ness people to resort to various illegal and semi-legal business practices to gain and 
protect their business and personal interests.  Such business practices in turn perpetuate 
and reproduce the problematic business environment, as well as reinforce and reproduce 
the ambivalent position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society.  I therefore argue that 
the corrupt local politics and murky political-business environment continue to exist in 
the Reformasi era not only because of the capture of new political vehicles and institutions 
by the New Order-nurtured predatory interests, but also due to the active role of many 
Chinese businesspeople in perpetuating the system.  Many, if not most, Chinese busi-
nesspeople in post-Suharto Medan and Surabaya are agents who maintain the status quo 
(of the corrupt local politics, the problematic political-business system, and the ambiva-
lent position of the Chinese minority) instead of being agents of change.
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